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Grant, Suberu and Harrison: 
Detention, the Right to Counsel and a 
New Analysis under Section 24(2): 
Some Practical Impacts 
Jennifer Woollcombe* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada released its much anticipated 
constitutional decisions in R. v. Grant,1 R. v. Suberu2 and R. v. Harrison.3  
Much of what the Court says about what constitutes “detention” for 
the purpose of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,4 is not really 
new and flows from the principles articulated years before in the Court’s 
landmark decisions in R. v. Therens5 and R. v. Thomsen.6 The interesting 
aspect of the decisions from the perspective of “detention” is not the test 
itself, but rather how the Court applied its test to the factual scenarios in 
Grant and Suberu. The Court itself was not unanimous as to whether 
Suberu was detained. These decisions may well make it more difficult 
for police to know whether and when they are detaining those with 
whom they interact, and will certainly challenge courts that have to de-
cide the issue later. We can expect this issue to be one that is much 
litigated. 
One reason it is now so important to determine whether there has 
been any form of detention is that in these cases, the Court broke new 
legal ground in resolving the question it had specifically left open in R. v. 
                                                                                                             
* Counsel, Crown Law Office – Criminal, Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario. 
Prepared for Osgoode Constitutional Conference on April 16, 2010. The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of her employer. 
1 [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]. 
2 [2009] S.C.J. No. 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suberu”]. 
3 [2009] S.C.J. No. 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrison”]. 
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5 [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.). 
6 [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
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Mann7: whether the right to counsel arises during an investigative deten-
tion. In unambiguous language, the Court overturned the unanimous 
judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and held that the right to 
counsel arises immediately upon any detention. This marks a significant 
change, and one that is likely to have a real impact on interactions be-
tween police and citizens on a day-to-day basis.8 
The most dramatic aspect of these decisions lies in the manner in 
which the Court has re-articulated the criteria relevant to determining 
when evidence obtained by a Charter breach should be excluded under 
section 24(2) of the Charter. Emphasizing the importance of determining 
admissibility after considering “all of the circumstances”, the Court has 
stripped away what had become the rigid application of certain rules and 
introduced, through three new lines of inquiry, what must be viewed as 
greater flexibility and discretion on the part of trial judges. It remains to 
be seen whether the effect of the decision will be to admit more evidence 
obtained in violation of the Charter.  
II. THE COURT’S CONCLUSIONS ON DETENTION  
AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
1. R. v. Grant 
Donohue Grant was charged with a series of firearms offences relat-
ing to a gun that was seized from him by police following an encounter 
on a Toronto street. He sought to challenge the admissibility of the gun 
on the basis that there had been violations of sections 8, 9 and 10(b) of 
the Charter. It is important to understand the police evidence about the 
circumstances preceding the discovery of the gun.  
Grant was a young black man walking in a high-crime area of To-
ronto. Two plainclothes officers, Worrell and Forde, were driving an 
unmarked police car in mid-day. They were on patrol to monitor the area 
and maintain a safe student environment for the four schools in the area. 
                                                                                                             
7 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). 
8 R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.). The Court of Appeal 
held, at para. 50, that a  
brief interlude between the commencement of an investigative detention and the advising 
of the detained person’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) during which the officer makes a 
quick assessment of the situation to decide whether anything more than a brief detention 
of the individual may be warranted, is not inconsistent with the requirement that a de-
tained person be advised of his or her right to counsel “without delay”.  
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A third officer, Gomes, was in uniform in a marked police car, intending 
to provide a visible police presence in the area. Worrell and Forde drove 
past Grant, and Worrell said that he stared at them intensely and was 
fidgeting with his coat and pants in a manner that caught their suspicion. 
Worrell decided to have a chat with him to see what he was up to. They 
suggested to Gomes that he approach Grant and have a chat. Gomes ex-
ited his car, approached Grant, and stood in his pathway. Gomes asked 
what was going on, requested the individual’s name and address, and 
Grant provided his health card. He continued to behave nervously, 
prompting the officer to ask him to keep his hands in front of him. The 
other officers got a funny feeling by the way Grant was looking over at 
them and approached Grant and Gomes, flashing their badges and ob-
structing the way. Gomes asked Grant if he had anything he should not 
and Grant said he had a “small bag of weed” in his pocket. Upon further 
questioning about what he had, Grant said he had a firearm. He was ar-
rested and searched, and the police discovered a loaded revolver.9  
At trial, Grant did not testify, but argued that he was detained before 
he made the inculpatory statements that revealed the gun. He argued that 
the detention was arbitrary and required the police to advise him of his 
section 10(b) right to counsel. The trial judge concluded that there was 
no detention prior to arrest and that the questioning by police did not 
amount to a search for the purpose of section 8. In the Court of Appeal, 
Laskin J.A., for the Court, held that Grant was detained during his con-
versation with Gomes, that the detention was arbitrary, and that there was 
a section 9 violation. He found no section 8 breach and did not deal with 
the claim of a section 10(b) breach. In considering section 24(2), he ad-
mitted the evidence, notwithstanding that it was derivative evidence 
following a self-incriminating statement that would often be excluded on 
that basis alone.10 
The Supreme Court was thus left to grapple with whether Grant was 
detained before his statements about the marijuana and the gun. Writing 
for the majority, McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. began their analysis by 
discussing the purpose of the rights linked to detention. They noted that 
individuals confronted by state authority have the option to choose to 
walk away and that where their choice to do so has been removed, either 
by physical force or by psychological pressure, that person is detained. In 
its effort to define detention, the Court noted that it had already rejected 
                                                                                                             
9 Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 4-8. 
10 R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.). 
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the extreme positions of “explicit control” over a person at one end of the 
spectrum, and “any interference”, however slight, at the other end of the 
spectrum. Ultimately, the Court summarized that: 
1.  Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers to a suspension 
of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical or 
psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established 
either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with 
the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would 
conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no 
choice but to comply.  
2.  In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it 
may not be clear whether a person has been detained. To determine 
whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances 
would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the 
liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following 
factors: 
(a)  The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would 
reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police 
were providing general assistance; maintaining general order; 
making general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, 
singling out the individual for focussed investigation.  
(b)  The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; 
the use of physical contact; the place where the interaction 
occurred; the presence of others; and the duration of the 
encounter.  
(c)  The particular characteristics or circumstances of the 
individual where relevant, including age; physical stature; 
minority status; level of sophistication.11 
In determining whether Grant was detained prior to incriminating 
himself, the majority found that once officers Worrell and Forde ap-
proached him, flashing their badges and taking “tactical adversarial 
positions” behind Gomes, after Gomes had told him to keep his hands in 
front of him, Grant had been “singled out” and the nature of the question-
ing changed from questioning about his identity, to an interrogation 
where the police had “effectively taken control over the appellant and 
were attempting to elicit incriminating information”. They noted that the 
power imbalance was heightened by Grant’s youth and inexperience.  
                                                                                                             
11 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 44. 
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Although he did not testify, a reasonable 18-year-old faced with three 
officers in adversarial positions would have concluded that his right to 
choose how to act had been removed by the police. They held that from 
this point on he was detained as he was constrained and in need of the 
Charter protections associated with detention.12  
Relying on its conclusion in Suberu that the right to counsel arises 
immediately upon detention, regardless of whether the detention is an 
investigative detention, the majority held that there was also a breach of 
Grant’s section 10(b) right to counsel. In this case, therefore, they held 
that the police were required to advise Grant that he had the right to 
speak with a lawyer and to give him a reasonable opportunity to obtain 
legal advice if he chose before proceeding to elicit incriminating infor-
mation from him.13 
2. R. v. Suberu 
Musibau Suberu was charged with offences related to his use of a 
stolen credit card. At trial, he brought an application seeking to exclude 
statements made by him, and evidence seized from him at the time of his 
arrest, on the basis that the evidence was obtained in a manner that in-
fringed his section 10(b) right to counsel.  
On June 13, 2003, staff at a Cobourg LCBO store were alerted that 
two individuals had been buying merchandise, pre-paid shopping cards 
and gift certificates using a stolen credit card and had bought $100 gift 
certificates in a nearby town. Musibau Suberu and William Erhirhie en-
tered the Cobourg LCBO. When Erhirhie tried to buy a $3 bottle of beer 
with a $100 gift certificate, one employee called the police, while an-
other tried to stall him. An officer arrived and spoke with the employee 
and Erhirhie. When Constable Roughley entered the store, Suberu 
walked past him and said, “he did this, not me, so I guess I can go.” 
Roughley followed Suberu outside and said “Wait a minute. I need to 
talk to you before you go anywhere,” while Suberu was getting into the 
driver’s seat of a minivan. 
Suberu and Roughley then had a brief exchange in which Suberu 
said that his friend’s name was Willy, that they were from Toronto, that 
they had driven from Toronto to Cobourg that day and that the van be-
longed to his girlfriend Yvonne. Roughley received further information 
                                                                                                             
12 Id., at paras. 45-52. 
13 Id., at para. 58. 
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over the radio, including the licence plate of the vehicle driven earlier in 
the day by the person who had used the stolen credit card, and asked to 
see Suberu’s identification and vehicle documents. Roughley looked into 
the van and saw Wal-Mart and LCBO shopping bags between the front 
seats. Roughley had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Suberu 
for fraud and did so.14 
On the Charter application, Suberu did not testify, but argued that he 
had been detained from the time Roughley told him to “wait”. The trial 
judge held that there had been a momentary investigative detention but 
that there was no obligation on police to provide section 10(b) rights. 
Suberu was convicted. The Court of Appeal also held that there had been 
an investigative detention, but found that the words “without delay” 
permitted a “brief interlude” between the beginning of an investigative 
detention and the requirement for the rights to counsel to be provided. 
Accordingly, it held that there was no section 10(b) violation. 
The Supreme Court had to decide two issues: first, the point at which 
Suberu had been detained by the police and, second, the point at which a 
detainee must be provided with his or her right to counsel. 
As a starting point, the majority seemed to have no difficulty reject-
ing the defence position that it was unfair to revisit the finding of 
detention when detention had been conceded in the courts below. In fact, 
the majority found that there was “no merit” in this contention, reasoning 
that the issue of whether there had been a section 10(b) violation had al-
ways been contested and on the facts of this case, that issue could only 
be resolved by determining when Suberu was detained. Because the trial 
judge found no section 10(b) breach, the majority held that effectively, 
the trial judge had found no detention before the time of the arrest.15  
The majority reviewed some of the key principles in the Grant test. 
They emphasized that police may engage in preliminary questioning of 
bystanders without giving rise to detention. Further, they commented that 
“the line between general questioning and focused interrogation amount-
ing to detention may be difficult to draw in particular cases”, but that 
trial judges must assess the circumstances to determine “whether the line 
                                                                                                             
14 Suberu, supra, note 2, at paras. 8-12. 
15 Suberu, id., at para. 19. The majority’s easy dismissal of the apparent change in Crown 
position was not commented upon directly by Binnie J., in dissent. However, he did note the appar-
ent contradiction between the majority’s stressing of the importance of deference to the trial judge’s 
conclusion on detention issues and then reversal of the conclusion of the trial judge and the Court of 
Appeal on the issue of detention. See Suberu, at para. 57.  
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between general questioning and detention has been crossed”.16 Recog-
nizing that this was not a case of physical restraint or legal obligation, the 
majority then applied the three-part analysis set out in Grant. 
In considering the circumstances giving rise to the encounter as rea-
sonably perceived by someone in Suberu’s position, the majority noted 
that Roughley had tried to engage Suberu in order to acquaint himself 
with what had happened. They found that as a whole, the circumstances 
of the encounter supported a reasonable perception that Constable 
Roughley “was orienting himself to the situation rather than intending to 
deprive Mr. Suberu of his liberty”.17 Thus, the first factor did not suggest 
detention.  
In considering the second Grant factor, the nature of the police con-
duct, the majority held that the question was whether the police conduct 
as a whole supported a reasonable conclusion that Suberu had no choice 
but to comply. While allowing that Roughley’s words were open to more 
than one interpretation, the majority found it significant that Roughley 
made no move to obstruct Suberu’s movement, and simply spoke to him. 
They concluded that as a whole, this was conduct that did not suggest 
detention.18 
Finally, in considering the third Grant factor, the majority observed 
that consideration of the individual’s personal circumstances is an objec-
tive test. The majority highlighted that Suberu did not testify and that 
there was no evidence that he subjectively believed he could not leave, 
and no evidence about his personal circumstances, feelings or knowl-
edge. They also noted that Constable Roughley had said that Suberu 
never told him he did not wish to speak with him and that the conversa-
tion was not strained. The majority concluded that the Grant test led to a 
conclusion that Suberu was not detained when he spoke to the Constable 
Roughley in his van.19 
It is noteworthy that in applying the Grant test, Binnie J. and Fish J. 
each reached a conclusion strongly at odds with that of the majority. Jus-
tice Binnie held that “no rational person in Mr. Suberu’s position would 
have thought that he was free to walk away or that the police would have 
let him go, had he tried”. Relying on the very conversation that the ma-
jority relied upon to conclude that the police made no more than “general 
                                                                                                             
16 Id., at paras. 25-31. 
17 Id., at para. 32. 
18 Id., at para. 33. 
19 Id., at para. 34. 
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inquiries”, Binnie J. concluded that Suberu was subject to an unjustified 
investigative detention.20  
After finding that there was no detention in this case, the majority 
then addressed the novel issue that was before it: when section 10(b) 
rights must be given. They found that “a situation of vulnerability rela-
tive to the state is created at the outset of a detention”, thus raising 
concerns about self-incrimination and interference with the liberty inter-
ests that section 10(b) seeks to protect. Accordingly, the majority held, 
without any discussion of the reasons advanced by the Court of Appeal, 
for a “brief interlude” before providing section 10(b) rights, that the 
phrase “without delay” must be interpreted to mean “immediately”. They 
were of the view that permitting any delay “creates an ill-defined and 
unworkable test” for the application of section 10(b).21 
The majority allowed little room for exception to this new rule. 
However, they did find expressly that this requirement is “subject to con-
cerns for officer or public safety”. Further, they held that the rule was 
also subject to “such limitations as prescribed by law and justified under 
section 1 of the Charter”. However, when they turned to consider 
whether there was a section 1 justification for a general suspension of the 
right to counsel during the course of a short investigative detention, the 
majority was “not persuaded” that a case had been made out for a general 
suspension of the rights under section 10(b) for investigatory purposes, 
whether or not there was some form of “use immunity”. They reasoned 
that the Crown’s invitation to consider a section 1 suspension of the right 
to counsel was premised on a view of detention that was too wide and 
that detention, properly understood, gives police leeway to engage in 
exploratory questions without triggering rights that crystallize upon de-
tention.22  
III. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
1.  How Does Anyone Know When There Is a Psychological  
Detention? 
There are cases in which the obvious markers of physical restraint or 
legal obligation to comply with an officer’s request are present. Those 
                                                                                                             
20 Id., at paras. 48-58. 
21 Id., at paras. 37-42. 
22 Id., at paras. 43-45. 
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obvious markers were absent in both Grant and Suberu. Thus, the Court 
had to determine whether a reasonable person in the individual’s circum-
stances would have concluded that he was deprived by the state of the 
liberty of choice.  
In many respects, it is difficult to reconcile why, if Grant was de-
tained, Suberu was not.23 In both cases, the Court makes clear that 
general questioning does not result in detention. It seems to have been 
the physical locations that the officers assumed, the change in the nature 
of their questioning, and their direction to keep his hands in front that, in 
Grant, tipped the balance. In addition, the Court was very mindful of the 
power imbalance between the young, inexperienced Grant and the three 
physically larger officers. By contrast, the majority in Suberu highlighted 
that the officer made no attempt to obstruct Suberu, that their discussion 
was brief, and that because Suberu did not testify, there was no evidence 
about his personal circumstances, feelings or knowledge.  
If there is a way to reconcile the bottom line in these two decisions, it 
requires careful analysis of each of the relevant factors — a task courts 
may be well suited for (although interestingly members of the court in 
Suberu could not agree on whether there was a detention). However, this 
is not the sort of analysis that police officers are easily able to do quickly 
in the dynamic situations they are presented with on a daily basis. Police 
must know whether they are detaining a person so that they can comply 
with the Charter rights of the individuals with whom they interact. The 
officers in Grant did not think they had detained him. Nor did the officer 
in Suberu. How can we ensure that officers know?  
In Grant, the Court appears to appreciate the importance of officers 
knowing when an individual has been detained. The suggestion is made 
that when officers are conducting a “pre-detention” investigation, and 
wish to ask exploratory questions, it is “open to them to inform the sub-
ject in unambiguous terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer 
questions and is free to go”.24 While unlikely to be dispositive of the  
issue, it seems probable that presented with a situation in which an indi-
vidual, provided with this information, later asserts that he felt detained, 
a court would be hard-pressed to conclude that he was. Certainly, were 
                                                                                                             
23 Indeed, Jonathan Dawe and Heather McArthur go much further and characterize the ma-
jority’s decision that Suberu was not detained as “startling and troubling”. See “The dawn of a new 
era: Pivotal decisions released by the Supreme Court”, Ontario Criminal Lawyers’ Association 
Newsletter, Vol. 30, No. 4, at 16 (2009) at para. 61 [hereinafter “Dawe & McArthur”]. 
24 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 32. 
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an officer to take up the Supreme Court’s suggestion, the Crown argu-
ment that there was no detention is greatly enhanced.  
The problem, of course, is that when police expressly tell those 
whom they have no basis to detain, and no intention of detaining, that 
they are free to go, the police ability to investigate is greatly undermined. 
This is so because many, if not most people, would become naturally 
suspicious of the situation and walk away. It hardly fosters trust, coop-
eration and conversation to say, “you don’t have to talk with me and you 
are free to go, but please consider staying for a chat anyway.” Such a 
caution, in these circumstances, almost suggests that the person should 
leave.  
Is there a better alternative for the police? One alternative to ex-
pressly telling individuals that they can walk away may be for police to 
be very careful about how they conduct themselves in dynamic, pre-
detention street encounters. Grant provides some good reminders. Police 
should think about the impact of their physical presence and position 
themselves mindful of the impact that their presence may have. They 
should think about the nature of the questions that they ask and be aware 
of when their questions move from general inquiries to questions in-
tended to elicit incriminatory answers. They need to be particularly 
mindful of the potential for a power imbalance when the person with 
whom they are dealing is young, small, appears to be vulnerable or is 
outnumbered by police.25 The majority in Suberu emphasized that police 
must have leeway to engage in non-coercive, exploratory questioning 
without triggering a detention. Police should feel free to continue to use 
that leeway, ever mindful of the impact that their words and actions can 
have on those with whom they speak. And, they must appreciate that 
situations can change very quickly.  
What about courts assessing the question of detention after? How is a 
trial judge to balance all of the circumstances? As a starting point, Grant 
makes it clear that it is for the trial judge to determine whether there has 
been a detention on the basis of all of the evidence, and that deference is 
to be accorded to the trial judge’s findings of fact.26 Interestingly, in 
Suberu, while Binnie J. finds it odd that the majority effectively reversed 
                                                                                                             
25 In some cases, it will be self-evident that the individual that the police are speaking with 
falls into one of these categories. In others, however, police are at a distinct disadvantage because 
they have no way of knowing many things, including, for example, the individual’s age, whether the 
individual has particular vulnerabilities that are not immediately apparent, and what the person’s 
level of sophistication is.  
26 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 43. 
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the conclusions of the trial judge and the Court of Appeal in concluding 
that there was no detention,27 the majority held that the trial judge effec-
tively found that Suberu was not detained. We can take from these 
decisions that the decisions of trial courts will, for the most part, be de-
terminative.  
But, how does a trial judge, charged with the responsibility of bal-
ancing all of the circumstances to determine what a reasonable person 
would have thought, weigh the various factors? Having chosen to adopt 
the “claimant’s perspective (as assessed by the ‘reasonable person’) as 
the lodestar”,28 it would seem that the evidence of the person alleging he 
or she was detained ought to take on a new level of significance. Where 
the issue is psychological detention, one would expect courts to draw a 
negative inference against any accused who fails to testify on the voir 
dire. While no court has ever held that there is a requirement for an ac-
cused to testify, numerous appeal courts, well before Suberu, have noted 
that the failure of an accused to testify may weigh against a claim of de-
tention.29 This only makes sense. How is a judge to know about the 
individual’s feelings, vulnerabilities and impressions without evidence 
from the accused? The majority of the Court in Suberu, when consider-
ing the third Grant factor, placed significant weight on Suberu’s failure 
to testify as it meant that the Court had no evidence as to his subjective 
beliefs, and no evidence of his personal circumstances, feeling or knowl-
edge.30 Of course, the Court chose not to analyze the significance of 
Grant’s failure to testify. Time will tell whether this factor takes on the 
significance it should. That said, in its recent decision in R. v. Reddy,31 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal seems to pay only lip service to 
this factor.32  
                                                                                                             
27 Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 57. 
28 See Suberu, id., at para. 53. 
29 See, for example, R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 227 C.C.C. (3d) 70, at para. 60 
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Grafe, [1987] O.J. No. 796, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 267 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. H. (C.R.), [2003] 
M.J. No. 90, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 67, at paras. 45-46 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Burke, [2006] O.J. No. 2185, at 
paras. 9-10 (Ont. C.A.). 
30 Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 34. 
31 [2010] B.C.J. No. 49 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Reddy”]. 
32 It appears that there is only one appellate decision post Grant and Suberu that really 
grapples with whether police direction resulted in detention. In Reddy, id., while splitting on the 
result, the Court of Appeal was unanimous that the accused was detained when the officer, having 
learned that the accused driver was subject to a probation order with a condition that he not possess 
any cell phones or pagers, directed the driver to exit the vehicle so that he could check the car for 
phones and pagers. While the majority clearly adverted to the fact that the accused had not testified, 
neither the majority nor the dissent seems to have been influenced by this factor. See paras. 45-71 
and 142. 
490 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Beyond this, it will be for trial judges to determine in individual 
cases how the Grant factors ought to be weighed. There is no bright line 
between pre-detention questioning and the point at which detention be-
gins. This flexibility will, in all likelihood, lead to significant litigation 
on the issue of detention, particularly in the difficult arena of neighbour-
hood policing.  
2. What Will Be the Impact of Requiring That Rights to Counsel 
Be Given Immediately upon Detention? 
While choosing to inject considerable flexibility into the determina-
tion of whether there has been a detention, the Court left little flexibility 
when it comes to the issue of providing detainees with the right to coun-
sel. The Court was of the view that the right to counsel “requires a stable 
and predictable definition”.33 The result will be that once the issue of de-
tention is determined, it will be very clear, in most cases, whether there 
has been a breach of section 10(b). 
The most troubling aspect of the Court’s decision about the right to 
counsel is its seeming disinterest in engaging in any sort of analysis as to 
how, practically, providing rights to counsel to those stopped for a short 
investigative detention will play out. In his decision at the Court of Ap-
peal, Doherty J.A. cautioned that requiring rights to counsel to be 
provided immediately during an investigative detention results in signifi-
cant practical impacts on both the police and the detainee. As he noted, if 
police are obliged to provide every detainee with his or her right to coun-
sel, they are also required to stop asking questions and facilitate contact 
with counsel if the detainee indicates that he or she wishes to exercise 
that right. The full panoply of rights associated with section 10(b) are 
necessarily engaged.34 Not only does this delay the investigation and  
                                                                                                             
33 Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 42. 
34 The jurisprudence makes clear that the right to counsel is to allow a detainee not only to 
be informed of his rights and obligations under the law, but also to obtain advice on how to exercise 
those rights. Section 10(b) clearly imposes on state authorities who detain a person a duty to inform 
the detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and 
availability of legal aid and duty counsel. This is an informational duty. In addition, there are im-
plementational duties, triggered when a detainee indicates a desire to exercise his or her right to 
counsel. These include providing the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the rights 
and refraining from eliciting evidence from the detainee until he or she has had that reasonable op-
portunity. See R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Manninen, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 41, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 
289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pozniak, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 75, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 472 (S.C.C.). 
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require a redirection of police resources, in some cases those detained 
may suffer significant deprivation of their liberty and personal security.35  
Effectively, it may be that those who would have been very tempo-
rarily stopped for a short conversation with the police and then been on 
their way, will be detained for much longer. As the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario recently noted, most police officers who arrest someone and pro-
vide section 10(b) rights “are not standing with a telephone in their 
outstretched hand as they complete the s. 10(b) caution”.36 Frequently, 
while the informational component of the right to counsel is given  
wherever the arrest occurs, police cannot and are not required to facilitate 
the implementational duties at that location. Generally that occurs at a 
police station.  
The same situation is likely to arise with investigative detentions as 
the likelihood is great that these detainees will not be able to exercise the 
right to counsel at the location of the detention. There are many legiti-
mate impediments to having detainees exercise their right to counsel 
where detained. For example, the detainee or the police may or may not 
have a cell phone. Even if someone has a cell phone, cell phones do not 
work in every location, particularly in rural areas. Moreover, the right to 
counsel encompasses the right to private communication with counsel. 
Police may not be able to facilitate private communications during an 
investigative detention. A detainee may want his or her specific lawyer’s 
number located, which police may not have access to. There may be a 
need to wait for a call to be returned by someone providing free legal 
advice through available services. Police always have to consider all of 
the circumstances, including their safety and the safety of the public, in 
determining when and where a detainee can begin efforts to access coun-
sel. Moreover, those detained who might not have been subjected to a 
protective pat-down search for police safety as contemplated in Mann, 
will most certainly be subjected to a pat-down search before being trans-
ported by police to facilitate the right to counsel. In many circumstances, 
what might have been a short investigative detention may well result in a 
much longer period of more significant incursions on the detainee’s lib-
erty and personal security.  
The Supreme Court chose not to comment on any of these unfortu-
nate effects of its decision relating to section 10(b). Perhaps this sort of 
prolonged detention is a necessary evil if we are to ensure that  
                                                                                                             
35 R. v. Suberu (Ont. C.A.), supra, note 8, at paras. 41-42. 
36 R. v. Devries, [2009] O.J. No. 2421, 244 C.C.C. (3d) 354, at para. 30 (Ont. C.A.).  
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individuals are protected from self-incrimination. But, it appears that 
the Court did not want to seriously consider alternatives. 
Related to this is the interesting manner in which the Court re-
sponded to the section 1 argument that was advanced by at least some of 
the Attorneys General. While the argument appears not to have been 
pressed by Crown counsel in the Court of Appeal, Doherty J.A. summa-
rized it: 
The s. 1 submission, drawing on the analysis of the majority in R. v. 
Elias (2005), 196 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.), argues that a police 
officer’s right to briefly detain a person for investigative purposes as 
recognized in R. v. Mann, supra, is a reasonably justifiable limit 
prescribed by law on the detained person’s right to counsel as described 
in s. 10(b). The s. 1 argument assumes that statements made by a 
person under investigative detention would not be admissible against 
that person at trial except to explain or justify police conduct.37 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada was of the view that 
section 1 did not need to be invoked for police to effectively fulfil their 
investigative powers because the argument that section 1 was necessary 
was based on a view of detention that was “unduly expansive”.38 In dis-
sent, Binnie J. commented that the section 1 argument was “not explored 
in evidence or in argument to the extent necessary to permit adjudication 
of the point”. While in its earlier decision in R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias,39 
the Court had made clear that section 10(b) is not absolute and that there 
is room for a section 1 limitation on the right, it appeared unwilling to 
even engage in a full discussion about the availability of a section 1 justi-
fication delaying the right to counsel during an investigative detention in 
this case.  
Over the coming months and years, we will see the impact of the de-
cision that police must provide rights to counsel as soon as an 
investigative detention commences. There has already been some con-
cern expressed that the obligation to provide the right to counsel 
immediately upon detention forces courts to later choose between finding 
a detention and the associated violations of sections 9 and 10(b), or 
choosing to find no detention and therefore no Charter violation.40 In-
deed, several authors have commented that this may explain the 
                                                                                                             
37 R. v. Suberu (Ont. C.A.), supra, note 8, at paras. 64-65. 
38 Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 45. 
39 [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
40 See, for example, Hamish Stewart, “The Grant Trilogy and the Right Against Self-
Incrimination” (2009) 66 C.R. (6th) 97. 
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otherwise surprising conclusion that Grant was detained but Suberu was 
not.41 Obviously, no court should decide the issue of detention in order to 
produce a certain result under section 9 or section 10(b). Given that the 
Court crafted the Grant test and decided Grant at the same time as it de-
cided Suberu, it seems unduly cynical to suggest that this, rather than an 
honest application of the Grant factors, was what motivated the majority.  
IV. THE NEW APPROACH TO EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE  
UNDER SECTION 24(2)  
1. R. v. Grant  
Having concluded that Grant was arbitrarily detained and that he was 
denied his right to counsel, the Supreme Court then had to consider 
whether the evidence that was obtained in a manner that violated his 
Charter rights should be excluded under section 24(2). The majority 
(McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J., writing for five of the seven judges 
and concurred with in relation to the section 24 analysis by a sixth judge) 
began the section 24(2) analysis by acknowledging that while it had set 
out the test to be applied under section 24(2) in R. v. Collins42 and then 
qualified that test under R. v. Stillman,43 there were difficulties that war-
ranted revising the approach to section 24(2). 
In terms of overview, the Court held that the phrase “bring the ad-
ministration of justice into disrepute” does not look at the individual case 
but, instead, at the overall reputation of the justice system in the long 
term, viewed from the objective perspective of a reasonable person in-
formed of the relevant circumstances and values underlying the Charter. 
Section 24(2) is not to punish an accused or compensate an accused — it 
must consider the broad impact of the Charter breach on the reputation of 
the justice system.  
                                                                                                             
41 See Stewart, id.; Tim Wightman & Dallas Mack, “A Death on the way to Rome: Has 
Suberu Marked the End of Investigative Detention?”, September 7, 2009, Crown NetLetter Collec-
tion of Criminal Law Articles, CRWN/2009-148; Dawe & McArthur, supra, note 23, at para. 62. 
42 [1987] S.C.J. No. 15,  [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). The well-known Collins test requires 
three factors to be considered: whether the evidence will undermine the fairness of the trial by effec-
tively conscripting the accused against himself or herself; the seriousness of the breach; and the 
effect of excluding the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice.  
43 [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.). Stillman held that conscriptive evi-
dence is generally inadmissible because of the concerns it raises in relation to trial fairness.  
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The majority made clear that in cases in which a trial judge has con-
sidered all of the proper factors, considerable deference should be 
accorded to his or her determination about admissibility under section 
24(2).44 
Grant identifies three interests to consider and balance when con-
ducting a section 24(2) analysis. No rule governs how the balance is to 
be struck between them. These factors are: 
(1)  Seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct: This line of 
inquiry tries to place the conduct that resulted in the Charter breach 
along a continuum — from an inadvertent and minor breach at one 
end to a wilful and flagrant disregard of Charter rights at the other. 
The more serious the misconduct, the greater the need for the court 
system to distance itself from that conduct by excluding the evi-
dence. However, factors such as good faith on the part of the 
police reduce the seriousness of the misconduct and lead towards 
admission.  
(2) Impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the ac-
cused: The second avenue of inquiry focuses on the impact of the 
breach on the accused. Again, there is a broad spectrum of impacts 
from a fleeting and minimally invasive breach to a powerfully in-
trusive breach. Courts must consider the interests engaged by the 
right that was infringed and the degree to which the violation im-
pacted upon those interests. 
(3)  Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. 
This arm of the inquiry looks at society’s interest in adjudication of a 
criminal case on its merits. The Court held that the reliability of the evi-
dence is an important factor in this line of inquiry. A related factor is the 
importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case. By this, the major-
ity reasoned that the admission of evidence that is less reliable more 
adversely affects the administration of justice if it is central to the 
Crown’s case and, conversely, the exclusion of highly reliable evidence 
negatively affects the administration of justice if it is the entire Crown 
case.45 
                                                                                                             
44 Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 86. 
45 Id., at paras. 72-87. 
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The majority went on to categorize types of evidence and provide 
some guidance as to how the three lines of inquiry might play out for 
these types of evidence.  
(a)  Statements of an Accused 
While emphasizing that there is no “absolute rule” excluding Char-
ter-infringing statements, the majority commented that these statements 
tend to be excluded. Because statements engage the principle against 
self-incrimination, and because police conduct in obtaining statements is 
constrained, the impression on the administration of justice if these 
statements are admitted is that the courts condone police misconduct. 
The first inquiry, therefore, supports exclusion of the statements. While 
the second inquiry usually will lead to exclusion, the majority noted that 
the extent to which an individual’s interests are undermined depends to 
some extent on the circumstances, and that there may be cases in which 
the impact on an accused is less. The third inquiry, which requires con-
sideration of having a fair trial on the merits, tends to lead to exclusion of 
the statement because of concerns about the reliability of the improperly 
obtained statement.46  
(b)  Bodily Evidence 
Under Stillman, this evidence was characterized as conscriptive evi-
dence and its exclusion was practically automatic because of the impact 
on trial fairness of admitting it. The majority noted that the Stillman ap-
proach had been criticized for, first, failing to consider “all of the 
circumstances”, second, because bodily samples are not really analogous 
to statements in that they raise different issues in terms of the administra-
tion of justice, and, third, because the conscriptive test has led to 
anomalous results. Accordingly, the majority held that the conscription 
test should be replaced by a more flexible one based on all of the circum-
stances. The seriousness of the infringing conduct will depend on the 
factual scenario. The second inquiry, into the seriousness of the breach of 
the accused’s rights, runs a spectrum from forcible taking of samples at 
the serious end of the spectrum to innocuous procedures like fingerprint-
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ing at the other end. The third inquiry will usually favour admission be-
cause of the reliability of the samples.47  
(c)  Non-bodily Physical Evidence 
Under the three-part inquiry, the majority held that the seriousness of 
the conduct will usually depend on the extent to which the conduct was 
egregious or deliberate. The second inquiry usually means analyzing the 
impact of a section 8 breach. This turns on the extent to which an indi-
vidual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated. The third 
inquiry will usually favour admission because of the absence of any reli-
ability concerns with this type of evidence.48 
(d) Derivative Evidence 
Derivative evidence is complex because it may include both state-
ments and physical evidence. The majority noted that the doctrine of 
discoverability was developed to differentiate between evidence obtained 
as a result of an accused conscripting himself or herself (which would be 
excluded) and evidence that would have been obtained by the police 
anyway (which was more likely admitted). While discoverability remains 
useful, the majority held that three lines of inquiry ought to be under-
taken. The first step is to consider the police or state conduct that led to 
the statement being improperly obtained. At the second stage of inquiry 
where the impact of the breach is assessed, the focus is on the extent of 
the Charter breach. Here, the question of whether the evidence was inde-
pendently discoverable is relevant. The third line of inquiry will usually 
favour admission because the evidence is usually physical evidence that 
raises no reliability concerns.49  
2. The New Test Applied to the Grant Facts 
The gun taken from Grant was derivative evidence because it was 
obtained as a result of his statement, which was made in violation of his 
Charter rights. The majority considered its three-part inquiry. 
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(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  SOME PRACTICAL IMPACTS 497 
• The police conduct was not abusive and their error in believing that 
Grant was not detained was “understandable”. Because their breach 
was neither deliberate nor egregious, admitting the evidence would 
not seriously undermine public confidence in the rule of law. 
• Under the second inquiry, the majority noted that the police had vio-
lated both Grant’s section 9 and his section 10(b) rights. It 
characterized the section 9 breach as “not severe” but “more than 
minimal”. The police questioning, in violation of Grant’s right to 
counsel, was a search for incriminatory statements, and, when 
viewed with the section 9 breach, meant that there was a “signifi-
cant” breach of Grant’s rights.  
• Under the third inquiry, the majority noted that the gun was reliable 
evidence and essential to the Crown’s case.  
Ultimately, while agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the case was 
“close”, the majority resolved the balancing in favour of admitting the 
gun.50  
3. R. v. Harrison  
Released on the same day as Grant, the Court’s decision in Harrison 
demonstrates just how seriously the Supreme Court views police mis-
conduct in the section 24(2) analysis.  
 Bradley Harrison was stopped by police while driving with a friend 
near Kirkland Lake, Ontario. Police Constable Bertoncello testified that 
he saw the vehicle travelling at the speed limit in the opposite direction 
from him with a line of cars behind it. The car had no front licence plate, 
a requirement in Ontario. He turned around to follow the vehicle and ac-
tivated his roof lights to pull it over. He then realized that because it was 
registered in Alberta, it did not require a front plate. He learned over his 
radio that the vehicle had been rented from the Vancouver airport. Al-
though he had no grounds to believe that any offence was being 
committed, he pulled the car over as he thought abandoning the detention 
may have affected the integrity of the police in the eyes of observers.  
Harrison identified himself to the officer and produced the vehicle 
registration, insurance and rental agreement. He was unable to find his 
driver’s licence. The officer ran a computer check, learned that Harri-
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son’s licence was suspended, and arrested him. The occupants were 
asked if there were drugs or weapons in the vehicle and they replied that 
there were not. Constable Bertoncello then searched the vehicle “incident 
to arrest” for the licence. The officer found two cardboard boxes that 
were taped shut and was told by the passenger that they contained dishes 
and books for his mother. The officer asked if there were drugs and 
weapons in the box and the passenger said “yeah”. One box contained 
cocaine. The vehicle contained 35 kilograms of cocaine.51 
It was common ground at all levels of court that there was a breach 
of Harrison’s sections 8 and 9 rights as the detention was arbitrary and 
the search unreasonable. The issue was whether the cocaine should be 
admitted under section 24(2). The trial judge applied the Collins factors 
and admitted the cocaine. The Court of Appeal for Ontario split with the 
majority (O’Connor A.C.J.O. and MacPherson J.A.) affirming the trial 
judge’s decision to admit the evidence and Cronk J.A., in dissent, exclud-
ing the evidence. 
The Supreme Court considered the three Grant lines of inquiry. Not-
ing that the trial judge had found the officer’s conduct to be “brazen” and 
“flagrant”, the Court agreed that the police conduct showed a blatant dis-
regard for the accused’s Charter rights, and that the officer’s misleading 
evidence at trial aggravated his conduct. In trying to characterize the im-
pact of the breaches on Harrison, the Court acknowledged the Court of 
Appeal’s observations that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in 
a vehicle, that but for the incriminating evidence, the stop would have 
been brief, and that there was nothing that impacted on Harrison’s dig-
nity. However, the Court cautioned that an unjustified stop and search by 
police is “much more than trivial”, resulting in a “significant, although 
not egregious” intrusion on the accused’s rights. Finally, under the third 
line of inquiry, the Court noted that the evidence was reliable and critical 
to the Crown’s case.52  
Ultimately, in conducting the requisite balancing, the Court was clear 
that “dissociation of the justice system from police misconduct does not 
always trump the truth-seeking interests of the criminal justice system”. 
However, in this case, the Court was clearly troubled by the police mis-
conduct and found that “the price paid for an acquittal in these 
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circumstances is outweighed by the importance of maintaining Charter 
standards”. The evidence was excluded and Harrison acquitted.53  
4. The Supreme Court since Grant and Harrison 
Since its decisions in Grant and Harrison, the Supreme Court has re-
leased only two decisions in which there was any significant section 
24(2) analysis.  
In the first, R. v. Beaulieu,54 an appeal as of right, the Court consid-
ered the admissibility of the evidence relating to a gun that police had 
discovered while installing judicially authorized listening devices in the 
car. The trial judge found a section 8 breach because the police exceeded 
the scope of the judicial authorization when they searched the vehicle as 
they did, but admitted the gun under section 24(2). The Quebec Court of 
Appeal divided, with the majority excluding the evidence, allowing the 
appeal and setting aside the conviction. 
The Supreme Court issued a short, unanimous judgment. First, it 
emphasized what was said in Grant: that “considerable deference” is 
owed to a trial judge’s assessment under section 24(2). Second, while 
noting that the lower courts did not have the benefit of Grant, the Court 
emphasized another point from Grant: that “the relevant factors have not 
changed” from Collins. Finally, the Court accepted that the trial judge 
did consider the Grant factors: the trial judge found that the breach was 
not serious, that the accused had a reduced expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle, that the search was minimally invasive and that the gun was reli-
able evidence. The Court allowed the Crown appeal and restored the 
conviction.  
In the second case, R. v. Morelli,55 the Court considered an accused’s 
appeal from conviction for child pornography. A computer technician 
went to the accused’s home to install a high-speed Internet connection. 
While there, he noticed that the “favourites” list on the web browser in-
cluded links to both adult and child pornography. More than two months 
later, he reported what he had seen to social services and the matter was 
investigated by the RCMP. A search warrant was subsequently issued and 
the search revealed that the computer had child pornography images. The 
challenge to the search warrant was dismissed at trial and by a majority 
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of the Court of Appeal, but proceeded to the Supreme Court on the basis 
of the dissent. 
Writing for the majority, Fish J. found that there were no reasonable 
and probable grounds for the issuance of the search warrant. Accord-
ingly, the search of the computer resulted in a section 8 breach. The 
majority then engaged in a section 24(2) analysis.56 Noting that the 
search was in furtherance of a search warrant and that the police did 
nothing to wilfully or negligently breach the accused’s Charter rights, the 
majority characterized the search and seizure as not particularly egre-
gious. However, the Court was clearly unimpressed by the conduct of the 
officer who prepared the information to obtain a search warrant (“ITO”) 
for the warrant. He was not diligent in his disclosure obligations and the 
drafting of the ITO was found to be “at best” improvident and careless. 
While not interfering with the trial judge’s finding that there was no de-
liberate misconduct, there was significant unacceptable police conduct. 
In terms of the impact on the accused, the majority found the breach par-
ticularly important as there was a violation of the accused’s home, of his 
personal computer and of his wife’s laptop. The Court emphasized that 
computers contain intimate, personal details, and that it was “difficult to 
conceive of a s. 8 breach with a greater impact on the Charter protected 
privacy interests of the accused than occurred in this case”. The third set 
of factors weighed against exclusion. In the balancing, the majority held: 
In my view, the repute of the administration of justice will be 
significantly undermined if criminal trials are permitted to proceed on the 
strength of evidence obtained from the most private “place” in the home 
on the basis of misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete Informations upon 
which a search warrant was issued.57 
5. Where Does the New Test Leave Courts? 
Not surprisingly, the section 24(2) avenues of inquiry have been con-
sidered by numerous provincial appellate courts across the country. It is 
too early for any sort of grand pronouncements about the extent to which 
the new test changes the result. However, a few observations are war-
ranted. 
First, there can be little dispute that the Supreme Court of Canada 
has intentionally provided trial courts with an increased degree of  
                                                                                                             
56 The dissenting judges found no s. 8 breach and so did not engage in any s. 24(2) analysis. 
57 Morelli, supra, note 55, at paras. 98-113. 
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flexibility in its new test. Gone are the rigid rules that often operated to 
produce incongruent results, particularly in the area of conscriptive evi-
dence. However, this new flexibility is not without fairly fulsome 
guidelines relating to each of the three lines of inquiry. These guidelines 
will significantly narrow the scope of judicial discretion and should assist 
judges in identifying each of the relevant factors to consider in any par-
ticular case. While there is obviously considerable discretion in the 
ultimate balancing, in many cases the three lines of inquiry should point 
in one direction or the other.  
Justice Doherty recently characterized what the Supreme Court of 
Canada did in Grant as taking a “judicial wire brush to the 20 years of 
jurisprudential gloss that had built up around s. 24(2) and scrubbed down 
to the bare words of the section”.58 That may be so. Fortunately, it ap-
pears that the “new” test has been easily embraced and applied by 
provincial appeal courts. If these cases tell us anything, it is that the 
Grant factors are capable of being understood and considered, and that 
they give courts sufficient signposts to engage in the new test.59 These 
cases read as thoughtful considerations of the very factors that should be 
relevant to deciding whether to admit evidence that was obtained in 
breach of an accused’s Charter rights.  
Second, it appears that one of the most important factors for courts to 
consider may be the conduct of the police. Flagrant and wilful breaches 
of an accused’s Charter rights will not be tolerated and will result in the 
first Grant factor weighing strongly against admission. Less intentional 
conduct, like carelessness and sloppiness, will also weigh against admis-
sion and the balance will likely tip towards exclusion if the breach is 
particularly intrusive of the accused’s Charter-protected rights. By con-
trast, in cases in which the police conduct themselves appropriately, act 
in good faith and cannot be faulted, the balance should tip towards ad-
mission. As a practical matter, the police rationale for what was said and 
done and why needs to be explored carefully in every Charter voir dire, 
as a trial judge’s view of the officers’ actions is likely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the result under section 24(2).  
Third, there remains a heightened concern for statements taken in 
violation of an accused’s Charter rights and derivative evidence then  
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obtained. While there is no automatic rule excluding this sort of evi-
dence, the Court held in Grant that the likelihood of exclusion remains 
high. That said, it should be remembered that Grant’s gun was derivative 
of his statement taken in violation of his section 9 and section 10(b) 
rights. Yet, the majority admitted the highly reliable gun despite the “sig-
nificant” breaches of sections 8 and 9, appearing to place considerable 
weight on the reliability of the gun and its importance to the case. There 
will be room for argument against exclusion even if an accused’s state-
ment is obtained in violation of his Charter rights. This may be one of the 
most important practical effects of the new analysis. 
Fourth, while deference to a trial judge’s conclusion under section 
24(2) has been the law for some time, the importance of this was empha-
sized both in Grant and, recently, in Beaulieu. If a trial judge adverts to 
the Grant factors, appeal courts should be loath to interfere, just because 
they might have struck the ultimate balance differently. Trial courts that 
truly fail to consider the Grant factors, however, are not, and should not 
be, immune from review.  
Finally, it will take time for patterns to emerge under the new section 
24(2). In the short run, we can expect fulsome and creative arguments to 
test the bounds of the Grant test. 
